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Abstract
Patronage, expansively conceived as covering all forms of bias and discrimination, is
pervasive in organisations and professions, including academia. Four key types of
academic patronage operate through decisions made, processes used, assistance
given to individuals and personal interactions. Some forms of patronage, especially
discrimination on the basis of gender and ethnicity, have come under sustained
criticism and are officially stigmatised. However, policies for equal opportunity and
against conflicts of interest have only begun to address more personal forms of
patronage. Some forms of patronage, such as supporting one’s research students,
are common and treated as normal; systems without such patronage would seem
strange. Looking at patronage in a broad sense can be useful in highlighting abuses
that escape the usual lenses of anti-discrimination.
Introduction
At the University of New South Wales, a scandal was reported concerning the
Educational Testing Centre (Hicks, 2005; see also Audit Office, 2001). There were
allegations of favouritism and bullying. One fact stood out: one quarter of the
employees were relatives of each other. This seemed to be a case of nepotism.
Could they all have been appointed on merit?
This may be an extreme example, but milder forms are pervasive in nearly every
organisation, including universities (McNamee & Miller, 2004). I use the word
“patronage” to refer to favouritism based on attributes not connected with merit or
performance. The person favoured can be a relative, friend, spouse, protégé or
student, or share the same gender, ethnicity, social class, age, religion, political views
or other beliefs.
This is an expansive definition of patronage, incorporating all sorts of bias and special
privilege: see Table 1. Although the word “patronage” has some benevolent
connotations — as in a patron of the arts — it also suggests favouritism. Even in
something seemingly as innocuous of being a patron of a restaurant — a regular
customer — there is always choice involved, with someone potentially gaining
advantage over another.
Most attention in academic studies is given to specific types of discrimination,
especially those based on gender and ethnicity. My aim here is to use a broader
perspective to give some insight into common processes, problems, alternatives and
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strategies and, in particular, to highlight some common practices that potentially might
be considered improper.
Table 1.
Some common terms as used in this paper
Bias: treating entities unequally using a non-universal value system.
Conflict of interest: a situation in which a decision-maker, due to personal or other
relationships, has competing loyalties and is potentially perceived by others as biased
or compromised.
Cronyism: favouritism for friends and associates.
Discrimination: bias or unfair treatment, usually on the basis of membership in a
category such as gender, class or religion.
Equal opportunity: non-discriminatory treatment of individuals, typically in relation to
jobs or careers.
Favouritism: synonym for patronage.
In-group: a group giving greater advantages to members than non-members; a clique.
Insiders: members of an in-group.
Merit: worthiness based on capability or performance treated independently of
personal characteristics or group membership.
Meritocratic: based on merit.
Outsiders: non-members of an in-group, typically those working with or competing
with in-group members.
Patronage: any form of bias or discrimination, either by individuals or groups.
Prejudice: an attitude or value system involving bias, often towards particular groups.
Unfairness: an unequal outcome without a justification using universal criteria.
I start by describing key modes of patronage and give examples of avenues for
patronage. I then present arguments for and against academic patronage, describe
some systems with and without patronage and present several possible challenges to
patronage. I use the example of honours thesis examining to illustrate struggles over
a practice with considerable potential for patronage.
My aim is to use a broad lens to capture types of patronage not fitting into the usual
categories of discrimination and equal opportunity. That means I do not cover several
topics worthy of analysis, such as the reproduction of patronage — whether and how
recipients later become dispensers of patronage — and the social processes by which
forms of patronage rise or decline over time.
Patronage practices vary enormously internationally. In some countries, patronage is
highly entrenched, with god-professors acting as gatekeepers into an academic
career: no one without high-level personal endorsement has any chance of getting
ahead. In some places, this becomes what might be called corruption, with university
places available for purchase, out-groups denied access to study and excluded from
academic jobs, degrees given as favours to powerful figures, and senior academics
chosen on political rather than academic grounds. In other places — Australia, for
example — where student selection and staff hiring operate with more observance of
merit principles and where anti-discrimination legislation is taken seriously, patronage
typically takes less blatant forms. Here I look at these issues from a general
perspective: the case study is Australian, but the frameworks are meant to apply to
practice in a variety of higher education systems.
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Types of patronage
Avenues for patronage abound. Consider, for example, allocating offices. Whoever
makes decisions about which person gets which office can use this power to dispense
favours, giving the largest or most attractive offices to insiders. If you are assessing a
grant application or refereeing an article by someone you like, you can give it a more
favourable evaluation. If you are deciding the order of authors on a publication, you
can manoeuvre to make a favoured person the first author, or even add the name of
someone who didn’t do any work, as a favour to that person, in what is called gift
authorship (LaFollette, 1992, pp. 91-107). If you make decisions about who teaches
what, you can assign desirable classes or lighter loads to favoured individuals. Every
little thing in academia can be involved, such as priority in having your computer fixed,
the words used when your work is cited in a paper and the tone of voice with which
you are greeted1.
To list avenues is simply to point out that patronage is possible, not that it necessarily
occurs or is inappropriate. Whether an action is considered appropriate or
inappropriate depends on the culture in an organisation and society. In some
academic systems, patronage is the standard way of doing things and peers would
consider it highly unorthodox – even dangerous – to support an outsider instead of the
usual insider. On the other hand, when expectations of equal treatment prevail – in
other words, when meritocracy is the official doctrine – then giving favours may be
stigmatised, sometimes through policies and guidelines and sometimes through peer
expectations.
If patronage exists within an organisation or network, favourites are advantaged and
hence others are disadvantaged. Often it is useful to divide members of a group into
three groups: insiders, neutrals and outsiders. Insiders are the favourites. Neutrals are
those who are treated on their merits for the most part, except when competing
against insiders. Outsiders are actively discriminated against. Outsiders may include
critics and challengers, stigmatised groups such as ethnic minorities, and those who
do not fit in with the dominant style.
Many academics are members of two or more communities. For example, it is
possible to be an insider within a department, a neutral in relation to university-level
politics and an outsider in international professional circles.
Methods of active discrimination are just as varied as methods of patronage. They
include subtle put-downs, petty harassment, lack of support, ostracism, and direct
attacks including public humiliations, formal reprimands, demotions and dismissals.
Often the easiest way to get rid of outsiders is to make life unpleasant so they leave in
a way that looks voluntary. Potent techniques include preventing them from teaching
desirable classes, giving them no recognition for achievements and denying them
tenure.
One dynamic underlying patronage is control through obligation: by dispensing
favours, others may feel indebted and are more likely to support the patron2. For
example, members in a research team may co-author papers and cite each other’s
work, excluding outsiders from both collaboration and citations. Senior figures in the
team assist junior researchers, who are likely to reciprocate, especially when they rely
on continued opportunities for references, collaboration and access to equipment.
Independent researchers have a hard time competing against such an in-group.
Patronage can be categorised into four main types (see Table 2). The first type is
making decisions that favour insiders, for example in making appointments and
awarding grants. Such actions are fairly obvious and, as such, may be susceptible to
challenge in an equal-opportunity environment.
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Table 2.
Types of academic patronage
Type of patronage

Advantage for insiders

Disadvantage for outsiders

Decision-making

Advantageous decisions

Adverse decisions

Processes

Biased procedures;
stacked committees

Biased procedures; stacked
committees

Assistance

Advice; support; coaching;
inside knowledge

Absence or inadequacy of
assistance

Personal interaction

Encouragement; stimulus;
bolstering of reputation

Discouragement; ostracism;
bullying; undermining

The second type of patronage is biasing the processes through which decisions are
made, for example appointing insiders to a selection committee or, more subtly,
establishing a process that will make appointment of such people to a selection
committee more likely. For example, if most full professors are insiders, then requiring
a committee to have a majority of full professors will create a bias, although the
procedure itself is not biased towards individuals, only full professors. The advantage
of this type of patronage action is that outside observers cannot readily see any bias:
an intimate knowledge of the group or network is required to understand what is
happening.
The third type of patronage is assistance to preferred individuals to develop their
knowledge or skills. An example is providing inside knowledge about what is
happening in the organisation, how decisions are actually made, the strengths and
weaknesses of individuals, and likely developments in the future. This sort of
information can greatly advantage those who have it. It is patronage only if it is inside
knowledge, namely knowledge that others don’t have. Sometimes information is made
publicly available, in meetings or emails, but only insiders have the ability to decode it:
additional knowledge is needed for grasping the significance of the information.
Providing skills to preferred individuals is another facet of this type of patronage. This
can include how to deal with conflicts, control emotions, present oneself in interviews,
respond to challenges and much else. Again, if skill training is available to anyone on
a genuine open-invitation basis, this does not constitute patronage.
The fourth type of patronage is personal interaction, for example the way a person is
greeted in a private meeting or public occasion. It includes what is said, ranging from
open praise to derogatory comments, and, just as importantly, the way things are
said, including tone of voice and body language. Patronage at the interpersonal level
is often quite subtle and can be hard to detect, easy to misinterpret, impossible to
prove and easily contested. Despite its subtleties, personal interaction can be a
powerful motivator for insiders and disincentive for outsiders.
It hardly seems fair to count the twist of a smile or the tone of a comment as
manifestations of patronage; yet such minor features of personal interaction should
not be discounted because of the difficulties of measurement and documentation. It is
natural for most people to respond more positively to those they like and support and
to those who respond positively to them. Interpersonal interaction often lays the
foundation for other, more overt, types of patronage.
Table 2 also lists disadvantages for outsiders. In many cases, the word
“disadvantages” is far too mild: the impact of prejudice, discrimination, bullying and
other unfair and adverse treatment can be devastating (Twale & De Luca, 2008;
Westhues, 2004; Wilke, 1979).
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Some avenues for academic patronage, grouped according to the type of patronage
involved, are listed in Table 3.
Table 3.
Some avenues for academic patronage
Decision-making
Allocating offices
Approving sabbatical, conference leave and other leave
Approving visitors
Assessing grant applications
Assessing theses
Assigning projects to students
Assigning students to supervisors
Assigning teaching
Awarding internal grants
Awarding promotions or salary increases
Awarding scholarships
Deciding on co-authorship
Making appointments
Refereeing articles
Processes
Being a dean, head or other formal decision-maker
Choosing members of a selection committee
Choosing members of allocation committees
Handling complaints and grievances
Sitting on an appeal body
Assistance
Giving individuals information about opportunities for publication, awards and grants
Inviting people to apply for jobs
Inviting people to take up administrative posts
Providing individuals with information about operations, plans and other people
Providing individuals with training, assistance and guidance with appearance,
speaking and strategies
Writing references
Personal interaction
Defending individuals against attack
Giving individuals encouragement and support
Mentioning individuals favourably at meetings
Individual instances of patronage may occur randomly and without any coordination:
advantaging a friend here, gender-based bias there, preference for one’s student in
yet another circumstance. On the other hand, when instances of patronage are
systematic or coordinated, it is possible to speak of a patronage system or patronage
network. There are two basic types, centralised and decentralised. In centralised
systems, most favours are dispensed from a single individual or small core group; in
decentralised systems, favours are dispensed at any level and by anyone according
to common principles, whether overt or unspoken.
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Some special types of patronage systems are listed in Table 4. This list is not
exhaustive, nor are the types all mutually exclusive.
Table 4.
Some types of patronage systems
Anti-performance: high achievers are marginalised or discriminated against because
they threaten second-raters running the system.
Bullying: out-group members are harassed until they leave or — in some systems —
join the in-group.
Discrimination: in-group membership is dependent on an attribute such as gender,
ethnicity, nationality, class, discipline or educational background.
Dynastic: patronage is organised around maintaining a dominant group over time.
Godfather: patronage is dispensed by a single individual who expects total loyalty in
return.
Information: insiders are told what is happening and why, giving them advantages;
outsiders are deprived of information or fed disinformation.
Initiation: joining the in-group requires participating in rites of passage.
Migratory: a clique moves from place to place, appointing in-group members, either
seeking richer pickings or escaping sanctions for abuses.
Rule-based: patronage is dispensed according to rules that systematically
discriminate against out-groups.
Academic patronage can be considered a facet of in-group preference found at
various levels, as shown in Table 5. Psychologically, it can be seen as a manifestation
of the way people’s sense of identity relates to their membership of groups that are
socially significant (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The contrary process is called here
“equity”.
Table 5.
Forms of patronage and equity at various levels of social organisation
Level of organisation

Form of patronage

Form of equity

Self

Self-patronage: egoism;
self-promotion

Altruism

Family

Nepotism

Meritocracy; equal opportunity

Teams, firms, groups,
religions

Loyalty; partisanship;
team spirit

Serving the public interest;
equal opportunity

Gender

Patriarchy; sexism

Gender equality

Country

Patriotism, nationalism

Global citizenship

Human Species

Domination of nature;
human chauvinism

Animal liberation; species
egalitarianism

Life

Life chauvinism

Deep ecology

In this picture, patronage is simply another name for manifestations of in-group bias.
The different levels of patronage intersect and overlap, as shown by patronage in
academia. The most common general level of organisation in academia is the
university: patronage at this level means bias in favour of students, graduates or
employees of one’s own university. But within a university, individuals pursue their
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own careers (self-patronage), and there can be bias based on gender, nationality and
other characteristics. At yet a different level, there can be bias against non-university
people.
Arguments against and for patronage
Patronage, by definition, is a violation of the merit principle: insiders are given
advantages not deserved by their performance. In an equal-opportunity or meritocratic
environment, this is the principal argument against patronage. There are some other
arguments too. Some forms of patronage involve a conflict of interest, for example
when academics make decisions affecting others with whom they have close personal
relationships. Patronage can lead to undesirable consequences, including selection
for mediocrity, formation of cliques whose self-seeking behaviour reduces
performance, and a lack of diversity that causes a loss of creativity and insight.
Strangely enough, patronage is potentially damaging to patronees, the recipients of
favours3. In the eyes of others, patronees may be perceived as unworthy precisely
because they have sometimes received favours, even when in reality their
performance could justify their success. Furthermore, the personal development of
patronees may be stultified by an abundance of largess: they may not be presented
with sufficient challenge on the path to advancement, missing opportunities for
learning that arise from struggling against adversity.
Arguments for patronage are harder to articulate, at least when merit has become the
dominant rhetoric. The usual argument for patronage is that insiders are better, but
this isn’t an argument for patronage but actually a use of the merit principle to deny
and disguise patronage. A true argument for patronage justifies support for insiders
when they are less accomplished than others. The most common justification is
implicit: it’s a tradition or an expectation. The eldest son inherits the family business
because it’s always been done that way: it’s assumed to be right and proper; it’s a
cultural expectation.
When academics receive helpful mentoring, co-author papers with supervisors and
obtain jobs with the assistance of good references from supervisors or other
supporters, it is natural for them to continue the same sorts of practices, for example
by seeking scholarships for favoured students and offering them work as research
assistants and tutors, and, when in a more senior position, providing opportunities for
junior academics. In this sort of way, patronage is reproduced and seems entirely
natural: it seems to be the way academia operates and therefore needs no
justification4.
Within an academic context, patronage may be justified on the ground that insiders fit
in: they help maintain a harmonious work environment and thus increase productivity.
A dysfunctional personality may disrupt the group. The trouble is that this rationale is
easily used to discriminate on all sorts of grounds.
Another argument is that insiders are trustworthy. They will support the goals of the
organisation. They are team players. They won’t rock the boat. This sort of rationale
may be more common at higher management levels in which social characteristics
are more important and performance is harder to judge as an individual
accomplishment.
Another argument for patronage is that it works: if income or student numbers or
publications are buoyant, this provides an apparent justification for prevailing patterns
of internal decision-making. However, seldom is there any benchmarking with other
units that have equivalent starting points and similar financial and other support.

9

© International
© International
Journal
Journal
for Educational
for Educational
Integrity
Integrity
Vol. 2Vol.
No. 52 No.
December
1 June,2006
2009pp.
pp.xx-xx
3–19 ISSN 1833-2595

There seem to be few empirical studies of the actual performance of patronage
systems.
Systems with patronage
In any given academic organisation, it is likely that some types of patronage will be
stigmatised and rare while others are accepted and common. Nepotism, with family
members gaining advantages over more qualified outsiders, is not so common at the
level of academic appointments. It is an obvious form of patronage and hence easier
to challenge.
Gender-based patronage is one of the most long-standing forms, directly deriving
from patriarchy. In what is called homosocial reproduction, men appoint others who
are like themselves — and that usually means men (Kanter, 1977). In the “two-person
career”, wives or partners assist men to succeed in an academic career (Fowlkes,
1980; Papanek, 1973), with a few instances involving a reversal of the sexes. In peer
review, women may be judged more harshly than men (Wenneras & Wold, 1997).
Most men receive advice and mentoring from other men whereas women are more
likely to be excluded from support systems (Bagilhole & Goode, 2001). At higher
levels of management, male characteristics and styles are commonly considered
superior. Despite the efforts of feminists, including decades of efforts for equal
opportunity and affirmative action, women are still disadvantaged, especially when
they are parents. However, within this overall picture, there are pockets of patronage
advantaging women, instigated by other women and sometimes by men.
Decades ago, women were considered to be intellectually inferior and barred from
many occupations: academic patronage for males was institutionalised. Although
beliefs in male superiority persist in a few disciplines such as physics, today in many
countries official policies support equal opportunity.
A similar history applies to discrimination on the basis of family, class, religion,
ethnicity, schooling, disability and sexuality. Each of these still occurs, but in equalopportunity and meritocratic environments are increasingly stigmatised through official
policies and prevailing attitudes.
In some places, a more recent addition to the list of officially stigmatised forms of
patronage is that based on so-called close personal relationships, of which sexual and
romantic relationships are a common type but by no means the only form. A
friendship can be a close personal relationship. If your best friend is applying for a job,
you are unlikely to be, or be seen to be, an objective member of the selection
committee. However, friendships are hard to quantify, so bias on this score can be
hard to identify and police.
Patronage frequently occurs on the basis of disciplines and theoretical orientations. In
a school of philosophy and politics, philosophers are likely to favour appointment of
more philosophers rather than political scientists. In an economics department,
econometricians are likely to support appointment of more econometricians rather
than political economists. Likewise with pure mathematicians, organic chemists and
environmental lawyers. Battles within and between departments often follow the lines
of disciplines, specialities and allegiance to methods and perspectives (Becher &
Trowler, 2001).
One of the accepted forms of patronage is support for one’s research students,
including training, advice, references and job opportunities. It seems natural to give
assistance to your own students; this is especially tempting when they are pursuing
research aligned to your own. Is this inevitably patronage in the sense of giving these
students an unfair advantage? Not always: if all students have equal access to quality
10
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supervision, then no one obtains a special advantage. If every supervisor writes
equally objective references and has the same level of connections for helping
students obtain jobs, then no one obtains a special advantage. But of course this is
seldom the case. Supervisors with experience, power, prestige and well-developed
networks can do far more for students: their advice and insights give their students a
special edge in their careers and their colleagues and supporters are more likely to
give these students opportunities. Furthermore, when students follow in the footsteps
of their supervisors in terms of research ideas and style, supervisors are more likely to
be helpful. (A rebellious student is far less likely to obtain a high level of support.) So
in practice supervision is commonly linked to patronage and sometimes to patronage
networks based on loyalty to individuals and research traditions.
Struggles against patronage occur at several levels. The narrowest level is
challenging an objectionable instance of patronage, for example appointment of an
under-qualified man over highly qualified women applicants. Next are challenges to
forms of patronage, for example trying to reduce discrimination against women by
encouraging women to apply for jobs and ensuring that women sit on all selection
committees. Finally there are challenges to standard practices that seek to redefine
them as unacceptable. This occurred when exclusion of women from academic posts
was challenged. It conceivably could happen with supervisor patronage, for example
by saying that supervisors cannot write references for students, the way that today it
is seen as inappropriate for a parent to write a reference for a child seeking an
academic post.
Systems without patronage
In this picture, the concept of patronage is so broad that it is hard to imagine a world
without it, so it is worth giving a few examples. In buying groceries, most customers
receive no special deals. In a small corner shop, the owner might give family
members free or low-cost food — a classic form of patronage. But in supermarket
chains, these sorts of special favours are less common; indeed, family members of
the store manager may receive no gifts, certainly not openly, because it might alienate
regular paying customers and expose the manager to discipline from higher-level
executives. In some shops, employees can obtain special deals on merchandise, but
this is separate from favouritism toward customers with connections.
In buying a meal at a restaurant, patronage occurs when special favours — better
service, better food, complimentary meals — are offered to people because of who
they are, for example family members, police or politicians. In a high-patronage
establishment or environment, all sorts of people obtain special favours. If the police
receive free meals in a de facto exchange for not prosecuting violations of by-laws,
this can be called corruption. Patronage is less likely in highly bureaucratised, highvolume restaurants like McDonald’s.
An academic example is students obtaining admission to universities. In a fully
bureaucratised process with no special favours, every student is treated identically:
admission does not depend on who the student is, only on their grades, test scores
and other accomplishments. Many universities have forms of institutionalised
patronage, such as easier admission for children of graduates (a common practice in
the US, called “legacy preferences”), for local students compared to foreign ones and
for students able to afford high fees. Out-groups may be discriminated against, for
example on the basis of ethnicity or religion. There can also be individual patronage,
for example easier admission for children of the rich and powerful, especially relatives
of generous donors.
These examples suggest a negative correlation between patronage and the
processes of rationalisation, bureaucratisation and marketisation. The more an
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organisation resembles a classical bureaucracy (Hummel, 1977; Perrow, 1979), in
which employees are interchangeable cogs, the less likely patronage is to flourish,
and the more an organisation deals with clients or customers as in a perfect market,
without discrimination on the basis of extraneous characteristics, the less frequent
patronage will be.
However, bureaucracies and markets seldom conform to theory — they routinely
contain forms of bias, and indeed institutionalise them. For example, a university
admissions system run purely on market principles to maximise income might give
systematic advantage to children from wealthy families; if the student market is built
around maximising the scores of incoming students, then a different bias exists. If the
goal is giving equal opportunity to students on the basis of how they would perform
under equal conditions, then yet a different bias — involving forms of affirmative
action — would exist.
The point here is that although there is a link between opposing patronage and
bureaucratisation and marketisation, the rise of bureaucracy and markets does not
automatically eliminate patronage. For example, it is well known that patriarchy easily
coexists with bureaucracy and markets. Patronage needs to be examined on its own
terms.
In the past several decades, higher education in many countries has experienced
increasing rationalisation, bureaucratisation and marketisation, partly as a result of
massification, namely a vast expansion, and partly through competitive pressures
linked to globalisation (Marginson & Considine, 2000). Whereas universities once
served as upper-class entry to the ranks of lawyers and clergymen, they have now
become closer to an extension of high school, a general screening and training venue
for a wide range of occupations. This means that previous forms of academic
patronage — notably on the grounds of gender, religion, class and ethnicity — are
now more commonly opposed. On the other hand, commercialisation of higher
education expands the role of a long-standing incentive for and tool of patronage:
money. Departmental budgets, salaries, bonuses, salary increments, research grants,
consulting fees and investment opportunities can be avenues for giving favours.
Despite the continuing rationalising processes, universities contain many craft
elements, especially at the research training level — supervision of research students
is individualised. Likewise the appointment process is jealously guarded by local
members of disciplines, who claim exclusive rights to judge the quality of others in
their fields. These areas offer rich opportunities for patronage. Indeed, many would
see a system without patronage as alien.
Imagine an academic operation in which decisions are made without regard to the
special characteristics of an individual, only their performance:
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Papers submitted for publication would be blinded for referees, as is currently
standard practice for many journals, especially in the humanities and social
sciences. Furthermore, the author’s name would be hidden from the editor by
use of an intermediary service, to limit the editor’s ability to select referees to
give a preferred result. Alternatively, referees would be chosen using an
algorithm, for example randomly from a bank of people in the field. Not only
would the author’s name be removed from manuscripts as well as any selfcitations, but a textual anonymiser would be applied to hide peculiarities in
style. For certain types of technical papers, method sections would be judged
separately so that results would not bias referees.

•

Selection panels for posts would be entirely composed of strangers to the
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candidate, but not told the institution to which the applicant is being appointed.
Interviews would be conducted electronically with the identity of applicants
disguised by voice-modifying software. Curricula vitae would be anonymised by
replacing achievements with generic equivalents, for example a degree from
Stanford being listed as a degree from an A-level university — though some
might argue that degrees should be ignored in favour of outputs — and a paper
in Physical Review being listed as a paper in an A-ranked physics journal.
Referees who know the candidate would be ruled out; referees might be
chosen randomly from a panel, or refereeing replaced by a computer-based
assessment of performance.
•

Applications for research grants would be scored by six to ten assessors.
(Alternatively, applications would be given a score based on prior publication
and other outputs by the applicant.) The median score would then be used to
award a specified number of ballots in a grant lottery. For example, a median
score of 80% might give 8 ballots and so forth. Grant recipients would be
chosen using the lottery.

What these sorts of hypothetical processes have in common is an attempt to eliminate
the role of personal knowledge so that decisions are made using only information
about performance. The result may seem absurd today, but perhaps no more absurd
than attempts decades ago to eliminate bias on the basis of gender and other
personal characteristics (which of course have not been entirely successful). In some
places now, applicants for posts or grants do not have to reveal their gender,
nationality, date of birth or marital status: these are considered irrelevant
considerations in making a decision. When referees do not know the identity of a
paper’s author, the gender of the author cannot easily play a difference in the
referee’s response.
Decision-making processes that eliminate knowledge of who applicants are will be
opposed by those who want to control the selection process to ensure they are
comfortable with the outcome. This is most common in selection for jobs: candidates
are sought who will fit in, namely ones incumbents will feel comfortable with.
Everyone wants to avoid having to work with a “difficult personality”. The trouble is
that making compatibility an implicit criterion for appointees opens the door to a host
of forms of patronage based on gender, age, discipline and personal style.
Alternative futures
The vision of academic life without patronage may or may not be attractive,
depending on one’s location and values. In highly rationalised systems like
Australia’s, getting rid of remaining patronage practices might be logical from a merit
perspective, but brings the spectre of a fully bureaucratic, market-driven university in
which academics have no power but are merely cogs in a soulless system that churns
out graduates and research findings. Having the power to sponsor one’s students and
choose one’s colleagues might seem to one of the few remaining academic privileges
in market-driven higher education systems5.
From the point of view of those excluded or subordinated by these privileges — for
example the talented scholars who can not obtain jobs because competitors have
patrons, or junior researchers who have to please team leaders in order to get ahead
— any concerns by established academics about loss of their privileges might seem
precious. Nevertheless, there is a deeper issue here: is there any way to reconcile the
abolition of patronage with a workplace that maintains and strengthens collegiality and
mutual support? If the only vision is McDonaldisation of higher education, the situation
would be bleak. But there are other alternatives. Here I outline three.
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One direction is diversity of institutions and units. Merit can apply within a unit, but
units can have quite different goals and expectations. In Australia, all universities are
quite similar in their standards, size, mix of disciplines and orientation to teaching and
research. In the United States, in contrast, there is a much greater institutional
diversity, ranging from elite research universities to community colleges, from
enormous state universities to tiny places with only a few hundred students, from
research institutions to liberal arts colleges, from mainstream educational approaches
to radical alternatives. Among elite institutions, the expectations of academics at
Sarah Lawrence College are quite different from those at Caltech. For students, the
course structure at the University of Texas is different from that at Evergreen State
College. The point of this example is not to hold up the US higher education system
as a best practice model, as it has myriad problems, but to illustrate that institutional
diversity is one possible future that could combine elimination of patronage with
opportunity for collegiality and local control.
However, it should be noted that anti-discrimination initiatives are antithetical to
institutional diversity, and many would say rightly so, as when in the 1960s US federal
funding was made contingent on desegregation. Institutional diversity, to be
compatible with fairness, needs to provide equal opportunity system-wide, for
example at equal-quality male-only and female-only units. The more usual pattern is a
combination of diversity and unequal opportunity.
Another alternative is an egalitarian educational model. Abbs and Carey (1977), for
example, proposed a “new college” in which students and staff jointly make all
decisions. In their vision, the curriculum and learning methods would be cooperatively
decided, staff have equal salaries and status, and the small institution would be partly
self-sustaining through practical work, for example growing food, in which everyone
would participate. Abbs and Carey’s new college is the antithesis of market-driven
uniformity: instead, staff and students are highly bonded in a common enterprise of
learning. This model would not be attractive to many of today’s academics because it
would mean giving up the privileges of salary and power over systems for student
learning, but it could be deeply satisfying through personal engagement in meaningful
processes for personal growth and mutual support. Egalitarian education, by
eliminating academic privilege, eliminates many opportunities for patronage.
A third alternative can be called community education in an intellectual commons.
Students, rather than studying a formal syllabus, would develop their own learning
plans, which might combine some formal instruction, some self-education (potentially
drawing from online curricula) and some practical learning through work and
community education, the latter in the spirit of Ivan Illich’s concept of deschooling
(Illich, 1971). Research would include some traditional targeted projects and some
collective enterprises along the lines of free software and Wikipedia (Surowiecki,
2004). Scholars could combine in any way they pleased — for teaching or research —
possibly in collaboration with students and amateurs. There is no standard funding
model for this alternative: it could be based on projects or contracts, or based on a
guaranteed annual income. The basic idea is that learning would be decoupled from
the formal apparatus of courses and degrees and contributing to knowledge creation
opened to anyone irrespective of training and credentials.
These alternatives, however unlikely as images of the future, illustrate that intellectual
activity can be organised in various ways that avoid the poles of patronage and
hierarchical rationalisation. In each alternative, scholars would have the opportunity to
engage with like-minded colleagues with some degree of collective control over their
activities. But there is a penalty, at least in alternatives two and three: the status of
academics would be considerably less. This is a pointer to the core dilemma facing
any defence of patronage: in most fields, being a tenured academic is a privileged
occupation, with many more capable aspirants than positions.
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Challenges to patronage
Patronage can be undermined in various ways. At the policy level, processes are
crucial. Examples are journals setting up blind refereeing processes, thesis evaluation
procedures ruling out certain examiners and job advertisements being written in a
specified fashion. However, policies seldom cover all facets of a process. For
example, even when journals use blind refereeing, the editor normally knows the
identity of the author, can be influenced by author attributes such as their university
affiliation, can select referees predisposed for or against a submission, and can
interpret or overrule referee recommendations if desired. Seldom is there any
oversight to deal with editor bias. No doubt most editors try to be objective but good
intentions do not guarantee a fair outcome.
Many organisations have policies about job selection, for example about the content
of job advertisements and the membership of selection committees. But such policies
only control some types of bias. Seldom do policies specify enough detail to prevent
patronage. A typical scenario is that insiders want to appoint a particular person, often
someone already in the position or sometimes a known external person. This can be
facilitated by advertising a position in the person’s field, writing the advertisement in a
way tailored to the person’s strengths, picking the selection committee to be
sympathetic to the person or acquiescent to patrons of the person, manipulating the
committee procedures to rule out competitors, and giving the desired candidate inside
information about what to put in the application and say in the interview. Everything is
done by the book but the job is stitched up.
Policies and procedures are an important step in reducing patronage but just as
important are attitudes and prevailing practices. Attitudes are crucial. Old-fashioned
prejudice against out-groups needs to be replaced with personal sensitivity to possible
bias. Instead of thinking how to give an advantage to friends and treasured
colleagues, thinking might go along the lines of “I’d like them to succeed on their
merits”. Instead of thinking how to wrangle a scholarship for a favoured student or a
job for a mate, it would become more natural to think of all the other students and
potential applicants out there — many not even known — who deserve a fair chance.
Prevailing practices make an enormous difference to patronage. Even a single
instance of apparent jobs-for-the-boys at the top of an organisation can set the tone
for everyone else. Setting an example means doing things in a way that is seen to be
fair as well as being fair.
Patronage systems are easily entrenched: policies, attitudes and practices reinforce
each other. Changing all of these simultaneously can be extraordinarily difficult.
Examining theses: a case study
In Australia, many undergraduate degrees require three years of full-time study, with
an optional fourth year called honours designed for students seeking advanced
training in a discipline6. The honours year normally includes coursework and a
research component involving writing a thesis. Depending on the university and
discipline, the thesis may comprise anything from 25% to 100% of the honours
course; a typical length for a thesis comprising half the honours mark is 20,000 words.
For students pursuing an academic career, honours is the most common route, and it
is a crucial year: a first-class honours result is usually enough to obtain a PhD
scholarship but anything less makes subsequent efforts much more difficult. The
honours result therefore is a potential point of patronage: even a slight advantage to a
student can make a career-changing difference.
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Honours theses are usually supervised by a single academic in the field. Supervisors
vary considerably in their talents and interest in their role. Some give day-to-day
support in everything from thesis topic to grammar. Others take a more stand-offish
attitude, letting the student sink or swim based on their own efforts. Some supervisors
who take an intense personal interest in a student’s progress are grooming the
student for success. This might be called patronage, especially when the student’s
topic follows the supervisor’s research agenda or theoretical predilection.
Honours theses are marked by examiners; patronage can occur via the choice of
examiners. Consider the following possibilities:
•
Examiners are chosen randomly from a list of senior academics from other
universities. These academics have no interest in supervising additional PhD
students.
•
Examiners are chosen by a departmental committee from academics they know
or know about at other universities.
•
Examiners are chosen by the supervisor from academics at other universities.
•
Examiners are chosen by a department committee from academics in their own
department.
•
Examiners are chosen by the supervisor from colleagues.
•
The supervisor is an examiner.
When the examiner has a closer relationship — actual or potential — to the student,
patronage is easier to dispense. This is most obvious when the supervisor is an
examiner: if the supervisor personally likes the student and expects that the student
will follow the supervisor’s research path, then it is very difficult to avoid being
supportive. (When the supervisor and student don’t see eye to eye or have had a
falling out, having the supervisor as an examiner may disadvantage the student.)
When a supervisor’s colleagues are examiners, they may be influenced by knowing
the student personally, perhaps as a teacher in an undergraduate class, or influenced
by their relationship with the supervisor.
Examiners also can be influenced by their potential future relationships with students,
most importantly by being a prospective PhD supervisor or, more generally, by being
a like-minded person in the field, perhaps seeing the student down the track as
someone to interact with as a postdoc, a colleague or an important researcher. If the
student looks like fitting any of these roles, an examiner may feel extra affinity with the
student and be a little bit more favourable in judging the thesis.
In many cases, these considerations are not significant for career purposes, either
because the student’s performance is not deemed as first-class by even the most
sympathetic examiner or because the student’s performance is judged as outstanding
by even the severest critics. Where bias plays the biggest role is at the margin, when
a few extra marks make the difference between an honours result that garners a PhD
scholarship and launches a research career and one that leads away from academia.
Administratively, having supervisors as examiners can be said to be a conflict of
interest. This is especially true when supervisors have had a strong input into deciding
the thesis topic, assisting with data collection or analysis, and polishing the
expression. How can supervisors be objective when assessing projects to which they
have had considerable input? Having supervisors as examiners is also undesirable
pedagogically, because students may be hesitant to be open about their doubts and
difficulties, worrying that their supervisors may think less of their abilities.
Being an examiner for one’s own student can be awkward. If I try to be scrupulously
fair, I will take account of my own bias and, assuming I’m sympathetic to my student,
try to counteract this bias by being a bit tougher than I would be with an unknown
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student. But this creates a new unfairness. If I think my colleagues, examining the
theses of their own honours students, are likely to give them an extra advantage or to
be strong partisans on their behalf, then by being unbiased myself I’m actually
disadvantaging my own student. For example, in writing a reference, if I say my
student is in the top 25% while my colleagues rate their own students as in the top
1%, I’ve penalised my student by being honest — or even by being partisan, just not
as blatantly partisan as my colleagues. So to give my student a fair chance, I need to
be partisan myself. These dilemmas disappear when examiners have no personal
connections with students.
At the University of Wollongong, in quite a few departments it used to be common for
honours supervisors to be examiners. This was seen by some as a conflict of interest.
Eventually a policy — driven by Deputy Vice-Chancellor Rob Castle, among others —
was introduced specifying that supervisors could not be examiners. However, a
couple of departments were so resistant to this policy that they changed the rules for
their honours degrees, reducing the weight of the thesis component so it avoided the
new regulation. Their argument was that only the supervisor had the unique specialist
knowledge to be able to judge the thesis.
Meanwhile, regulations for examination of higher degree theses at Wollongong have
gradually been tightened to ensure that examiners are independent of the supervisor
and student. Normally two examiners are chosen. For PhDs, both have to be outside
the university and cannot be recent graduates. No one who has collaborated with the
supervisor or student within the previous five years can be an examiner. A new rule is
that a person cannot be used as an examiner more than once a year, intended to
prevent research groups using a trusted ally to approve thesis after thesis. The
guidelines for selecting examiners give the reason for these and related rules: the
intention is to find people who are “at arm’s length from the supervisor/s and
candidate so as to ensure the maximum degree of objectivity”.
Another innovation at Wollongong has been to have research students involved in
nominating examiners. The supervisor and student select four or five potential
examiners and sign off on the names; the list has to be approved by the academic
unit’s head of postgraduate studies. The supervisor and head of postgraduate studies
then recommend two of those examiners to the director of the Research Student
Centre, who will approve them if they meet all selection criteria in the university’s
guidelines. One goal of this approach is to ensure that unsympathetic people are
avoided: essentially, the supervisor and student each have a veto power. In earlier
years, when the student was excluded from the process, with the examiners chosen
by the supervisor or the department, there was greater scope for pressuring students
to conform to the supervisor’s research orientation. This process of involving the
student in examiner selection has recently been introduced at honours level.
The Wollongong trajectory for thesis examination has been one of gradually excluding
obvious conflicts of interest — especially examiners with strong connections with the
supervisor — and involving students in the selection process. The current policies
discourage patronage, ruling out supervisors and supervisors’ close colleagues as
examiners. Obviously there is still scope for patronage: a supervisor and student
could conspire to choose examiners who are friends or allies, but whose formal
relationships are compatible with the guidelines. Nevertheless, the trend over the
years has been to minimise opportunities for blatant patronage.
Conclusion
The concept of patronage, taken in a very broad sense, can be used to capture many
forms of bias, discrimination and conflict of interest. Academia is commonly seen as
an arena in which merit plays a stronger role than in many other occupations.
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Although challenges have been made to many forms of academic patronage —
notably discrimination on grounds of gender and ethnicity — many others remain,
often without much thought about problems or alternatives.
A vision of academic life without patronage can sound utterly alien, for example with
elaborate measures to ensure anonymity and independent judgement. To propose
such measures may make one sound like a zealot and, more seriously, to be implicitly
criticising one’s colleagues as not being objective. Furthermore, a fully rationalised
university, run like a factory line, would be unattractive to the workers, for whom
collegiality and a sense of common purpose make a huge difference. Reconciling
elimination of patronage with satisfying work is a challenging task: possible directions
include greater institutional diversity, small egalitarian cooperatives, and embedding
scholarship in community activity.
An important lesson from the experiences of academic patronage is how difficult it is
to bring about change. One reason is straightforward: many academics want to retain
their personal capacity to distribute favours, to friends, allies in their field and to
students. Research teams are commonly built around powerful leaders who reward
those committed to the research directions on which the leaders have built their
reputations and sometimes those committed to the leaders personally. Sometimes
such research empires are built on discrimination by gender, ethnicity or nationality,
but even when these play little role, personal and professional favouritism can be
significant. There have been major movements for sexual and racial equality but at
the moment there seems to be no equivalent movement to challenge more personal
forms of patronage.
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End notes
1

It would be possible to analyse differences in patronage dynamics between
academic and non-academic staff (or, in US terminology, between faculty and staff).
Non-academic staff can dispense some favours, may have alliances with academics,
be recipients of favours, and so forth. Characteristic relations between academic and
non-academic staff depend on the unit and the higher education system. Because I
approach the issue generally, I do not delve into such particularities.
2
I thank Kim Sawyer for this point.
3
I thank Kate Bowles for this point.
4
I thank an anonymous referee for this point.
5
I thank an anonymous referee for this point.
6
Four-year degrees are increasingly common, often with honours as part of the
overall degree taking into account results in all four years. With such degrees,
examination of the honours thesis or project is less crucial to the honours mark.
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